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ABSTRACT. In present-day movement science. N. A. Bcrnstein’s 
to1 mulation of the problems of motor control is often taken as the 
methodological propaganda, which rarely stand up to seri- 
ous historical scrutiny (Powers. 1982. pp. 75-76), 
starting point. The- reliance on Bernstein has not brought agree- 
nwnt among his followers, however. In this article, the authors 
pose thc following question: Does the disagreement arise from the 
structure of his work itself or from incomplete exploitation of his 
thinking’? By using, i n r u  a h .  Bernstein’s 24 English and German 
arlicles. the authors present an analysis of the development of 
Bernstein’s theory of movement behavior, against the backdrop of 
the scientific progress in the Soviet Union in Beinstein’s time and 
the clashes between Soviet politics and science. Bernstein 
addressed in his early articles the measurement and biomechanical 
analysis of movements. His experimental data soon indicated the 
nccd for a new understanding of the organization of movements, 
u hich he formulated in terms of coordination. Because of political 
problems, his work was interrupted; but after being “rehabilitated” 
arid again allowed to work, Bernstein aimed to explain how ani- 
m . h  lind and optimize the solutions to motor problems. The struc- 
IUI‘L‘ of the theory that ensued was comprehensive exactly by virtue 
ol his repeatedly shifting focus between the different aspects of the 
01 ganization of movement: More important than the answers he 
pave were the questions he asked. Moreover. the way he 
approached those questions may help scientists solve pressing 
pi t)hlems in present-day movement science. 
C:v word.s: N. A. Bernstein, coordination. history of science, motor 
CtliitroI. motor planning. movement science, self-organization 
I n thc beginning. . . 
During the process of initiation of a scientist, stories of the 
heroes of old are told. These “histories” perform several 
functions. They serve as legitimization myths for the present 
scientific community. showing it  inheriting the mantle of the 
giantb of former times. They help to impress the present 
dogmas and ideals of the scientific community on the 
novice, and suggest that past scientific successes have been 
due to fbllowing presently prescribed procedures. . . . Thus, 
for the most part, the potted histories which preface many 
textbooks are. not to put too fine a point on it, pieces of 
“Reading Bernstein is somewhat like reading the bible,” 
wrote Schmidt (1988, p. 22) ,  paraphrasing Requin. Semjen, 
and Bonnet ( 1984). Schmidt ventured that opinion during a 
conference on the motor-action coritrovrrsy (Meijer & 
Roth. 1988), where he defended motor program versus 
uction approaches to movement behavior. 
The polemics concerning those approaches started in 
1982, when Reed published his theory of action systems. 
Taking as a starting point Gibson’s (e.g., 1979) ecological 
theory of perception and Bernstein’s (e.g., 1967~) theory of 
movement behavior, Reed emphasized the importance of 
organism-environment relationships and acidly rejected the 
notion of motor program, calling it the latest incarnation of 
dualism (cf. also Turvey, 1977). Thus, Gibson and Bernstein 
became major sources of inspiration for the ecological 
approach to perception and action. 
During the conference on the motor-action controversy, 
Schmidt argued that Bernstein’s work can also be seen as a 
source of inspiration to motor program theories of move- 
ment behavior. He thereby rejected the exclusive claim of 
ecological psychologists on Bernstein as their founding 
father. Implicitly, Schmidt criticized mythological reliancc 
on Bernstein. 
Mythologies help students to identify with a particular 
science. In scientific debates, however, mythologies stand 
in the way. By highlighting solutions to the problems of by- 
gone days, mythologies obscure the doubts of the founders 
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R. Bongaardt & 0. G. Meijer 
themselves, thereby depriving the scientific community of a 
rich source of inspiration (Powers, 1982). 
I n  the polemics surrounding the motor-action controver- 
sy, mythological elements may indeed have confounded our 
understanding of the work of Bernstein. In the histories dis- 
cussed in the prefaces of ecological publications, for exam- 
ple, Bernstein’s conception of coordination has often been 
presented as the starting point for understanding movement 
behavior (Bernstein, 193511967e; cf., e.g., Turvey, 1990). 
A1 the same time, Bernstein’s theory of the motor program 
appears to offer an early expression of the ideas that eco- 
logical psychologists so strongly reject (Bernstein, 
195711967f; cf., e.g.. Schmidt, 1982). 
Whereas ecological and program approaches to move- 
ment behavior have been represented as being mutually 
cxclusivc, to Bernstein there was no conflict between pro- 
grams and organism-environment relationships. That idea 
will become apparent later in the present article, when we 
discuss the development of Bemstein’s work in its context. 
In contemporary literature, one finds a growing reliance 
on Bernstein’s work (Feigenberg & Latash, 1996). Never- 
theless, our earlier comments illustrate how easily such 
reliance leads to divergent, or even conflicting interpreta- 
tions. We contend that understanding Bernstein’s intellectu- 
al hcrilage is important in its own right. In the present arti- 
cle, therefore, we attempt to answer the following two 
questions: What is the main thrust of Bernstein’s theory of 
movement behavior, and what is the relevance of his work 
to the contemporary sciences of movement? 
Bernstein’s Translated Publications 
Ideally, the development of Bernstein’s work should be 
analyzed by historians of movement science who are famil- 
iar with contemporary debates, have a mastery of the Russ- 
ian language, and have access to all his written work. We do 
not meet the latter two criteria, and to overcome that limita- 
tion, we interviewed several of Bernstein’s colleagues. 
Of Bernstein’s more than 140 publications (Feigenberg, 
1988), 24 have been published in, or translated into, Eng- 
lish or German. Eight of the 24 appeared in Bernstein’s 
( 1967~)  The Co-ordination and Regulation of Movements, 
and reappeared i n  Whiting’s (1984) Humun Moror 
Actions: Bernstein Reassessed. Bernstein himself was 
involved in preparing the 1967 book (cf. Bernstein, 1967d) 
and probably revised some of its chapters (A. G. Fel’dman, 
March 1995, personal communication). In 1975, Picken- 
hain and Schnabel published a German version of Bern- 
.stein’s 1967 book with 3 additional articles, 1 of which 
was replaced by another article in the 1988, second edi- 
tion. The latter article can also be found in M. L. Latash’s 
translation of Bernstein’s book On Dexterity and Its Devel- 
opment (Bernstein, 1991/1996; cf. Latash & Latash, 1994). 
In 1987. Pickenhain translated Feigenberg’s (1978) edition 
of some of Bernstein’s research memos, and 4 articles 
appeared in 1998 in the journal Moror Confro/, in a special 
section titled, “The Bernstein Heritage.” The remaining 7 
articles can be found as original publications in German or  
English sources. 
The Structure of a Lifetime’s Work 
To avoid the pitfall of misrepresenting Bernstein’s think- 
ing by using only today’s perspective (so-called Whiggish 
historiography; cf. Olby, Cantor, Christie, & Hodge, 1990), 
we present here the development of his theory of movement 
behavior within its own scientific context. Because we 
believe that the historiography of movement science should 
contribute to the movement sciences of today (cf. Provine, 
1971), we also discuss the relevance of Bernstein’s work to 
contemporary movement sciences. 
Even with only 24 publications at hand, one can easily 
lose the overview of Bernstein’s work unless one orders the 
material according to some criterion. Most existing order- 
ings are based, each in a somewhat different way, on the sci- 
entific content of his articles (cf. Gel’fand, Gurfinkel, 
Fomin, & Tsetlin, 1971; Gurfinkel, 1988; Luria, 1987; Pick- 
enhain & Schnabel, 1988). By ignoring the context, howev- 
er, one runs the risk of missing relevant aspects of the con- 
tent. The order of events in Bernstein’s scientific biography 
therefore offers a more appropriate structure for the present 
article. Although the accessible biographical information 
about Bernstein is sketchy, it permits one to distinguish dif- 
ferent periods in Bemstein’s work (cf. Feigenberg & Latash, 
1996; Gurtinkel, 1988; Kozulin, 1984; Latash & Latash, 
1994; Luria, 1967, 1987; Pickenhain & Schnabel, 1988). 
Nikolai Aleksandrovitsch Bernstein was born in Moscow 
in 1896. His father was a famous psychiatrist; an uncle was 
a famous mathematician. In 1914, Bernstein enrolled in the 
historical-philological program of Moscow University, and 
he switched to medicine the following year. Having corn- 
pleted his studies after the Russian Revolution, Bemstein 
enlisted in the Red Army and served therein from 1919 to 
1921. Thereafter, he worked as a neuropsychologist, mean- 
while attending mathematical and musicological lectures at 
Moscow University. In 1922, Bernstein was invited to con- 
duct research at the Laboratory for Biomechanics at thc 
Central Labor Institute in Moscow. At the time of his 
appointment, the institute was in turmoil (Bailes, 1977). Its 
founder and director, Gastev, had been challenged to pay 
more attention to the everyday working conditions of labor- 
ers. In 1924, Gastev was able to resolve the conflict diplo- 
matically. With hindsight, one can see that political intlu- 
ence on the development of science was comparatively mild 
in the Soviet Union of the 1920s. 
That situation changed around 1930, when the Congress 
on Human Behavior explicitly rejected all mechanicism, 
specifically Bechterev’s reflexology. From then on, neu- 
ropsychology had to be dialectically materialist (Kozulin, 
1984). Bernstein himself did not run into problems with the 
authorities, but in the purges that followed, the Central 
Labor Institute was closed down in 1938, and Gastev was 
killed (Bailes, 1977). By that time, Bernstein had already 
moved to another institute. From the late 1930s until 1950, 






































Bernstein’s Theory of Movement Behavior 
he worked as head of the Laboratory for Biomechanics of 
the Central Scientific Institute of Physical Culture. 
111 1948, at a carefully prepared biological session of the 
Audemy of Science. it was announced that all biological 
scicbnces had to be canonized (Kozulin, 1984). Lysenko took 
rcsponsibility for genetics; and in another wave of purges, 
Soviet intellectuals were terrorized. In the 1950 Joint Ses- 
sion of the Academy of Science and the Academy of Med- 
ical Sciences, Pavlovianisrn (or, rather, Soviet neo-Pavlo- 
viaitism, which is the doctrine that Pavlov’s laws of the 
conditioned reflex explain human functioning) was declared 
t he official doctrine of neuropsychology. Adversaries were 
urgcd to “acknowledge their errors in print” (Brushlinskii, 
1903, p. 86: cf. Payne, 1968). At that time, Bernstein was 
considered a public enemy, and he was fired from his job. 
After Stalin’s death in 1953, Bernstein was gradually “reha- 
bilitated” and allowed to work as a senior scientist. Although 
hc officially retired in 1956, he remained involved in the 
work of his students and colleagues. 
In thc present article, we follow Kozulin’s (1984) lead 
and use the clashes between politics and science in the 
Soviet Union as ma.jor landmarks in Bemstein’s scientific 
biography. Accordingly, we have organized our analysis in- 
to lhrcc sections: The first covers Bernstein’s work during 
thc build-up of Soviet science (1922-1930) and was dis- 
cuxscd i n  part in the preceding section; the second covers 
thc period of “political correctness” (1930-1 948); and the 
third covers Bemstein’s work after the neo-Pavlovian craze 
( 1Wt-1966). Each of the sections is introduced by a sketch 
ol’ the relcvant context. 
The Build-up of Soviet Science (1922-1930) 
I n  1918, Lenin challenged scientists to increase labor 
efficiency in the Soviet Union and to ensure “the elimina- 
tion of redundant and inefficient movements, and the for- 
mulation of the correct methods of labor” (Lenin, 
lc)l8/197O, p. 249; cf. Pickenhain & Schnabel, 1988). 
Lcwin decreed that two existing laboratories for the study of 
lahor had to merge into one Central Labor Institute. The 
mcrger took place in August, 1921 (Bailes, 1977). 
Earlier, around 1900, industrial engineers in the United 
Sl&s had begun to contribute to the success of mass pro- 
duction by providing management advice (cf. Rabinbach, 
1990). Taylor (cf, e.g., Taylor, 191 3) recommended that 
rllitnagcrs use a stopwatch to clock the time that a skilled 
laborer needed to accomplish any elementary operation. 
Soon, however, the scientific value of selecting the pace of 
thc fastest worker as an absolute standard for all was criti- 
cized. Gilbreth and Gilbreth-Mollcr ( 19 18) proposed that 
industrial labor efficiency be viewed in a wider context. In 
thcir analysis of workers’ movements, they also relied on 
thc trajectories of the movements, thereby borrowing heav- 
i l y  from the French physiologist-inventor Marey. 
Gastev. the director of the Central Labor Institute in 
Moscow, found his major inspiration in Taylorisin (Bailes, 
1077). Gustev’s dream for Soviet industry was “mechanized 
collectivism.” in which “there is no longer any individual 
face but only regular, uniform steps and faces devoid of 
expression . . . , measured not by a shout or a smile but by 
. . . a speed gauge” (Gastev, 1919; cited in Bailes, 1977, p. 
378). Both within and outside the Institute, Gastev was 
attacked for his uncritical reliance on Taylor, his disregard of 
physiology and psychology, and his narrow-minded focus 
on isolated movements. To resolve the conflict among sci- 
entists, the Second All-Union Conference on Scientific 
Management was held in March, 1924. Gastev. urging for- 
bearance, convinced the delegates that his recently adopted 
policy to attract multidisciplinary expertise would enable 
him to stem the criticism. The conference attendees acceded 
to his entreaties and accepted the ideas promoted at the Insti- 
tute as fundamental to the economy of the Soviet Union. 
In 1922, Bernstein was invited to work in the biome- 
chanics laboratory of the Central Labor Institute. At the 
time, he was working as a neuropsychologist; he accepted 
the invitation, perhaps because he wanted to further his 
understanding of the brain through the study of movement. 
Throughout his career, Bernstein always collaborated 
with or stimulated collaboration with other research groups. 
In 1924, he was listed as one of the co-workers at 
Komilov’s Moscow Institute of Experimental Psychology. 
He frequently cited the Gilbreths and evcn copied some of 
their work. In this period, however, his focus was on bio- 
mechanical aspects of human movement. 
In the 192Os, the most pressing problem in the sciences 
of movement was how to make accurate mcasurements. 
Bernstein was directed to that problem by his reading of the 
six volumes of Braune and Fischer’s Hutnari Walking 
(1  895-1904). Braune and Fischer had credited Mechanics 
of the Hiiman Walking Apparatus (Weber & Weber. 
183611894, 1894/1992; cf. Bernstein, 1992) as thc classic 
study of human walking. In their time, the Webers modeled 
the freely swinging leg as a jointed pendulum and suggest- 
ed that men could walk more efficiently by exploiting the 
pendulum properties of their legs (Flesher, 1997). Braune 
and Fischer ( 1895-1904) disagreed: Pendulum models are 
not adequate because the legs are always under the control 
of voluntary muscle action, they argued. They also claimed 
that one could experimentally resolve that issuc by per- 
forming precise measurements. 
Several innovative techniques for the measurement of 
walking had been developed by the Weber brothers in the 
1830s. They had measured, for instance, the inclination of 
the trunk by adjusting a cross-hair in their telescope. In the 
1 870s Marey developed myography and odography, tech- 
niqucs with which displacements of body parts are directly 
registered on a rotating drum (Marey, 1878; cf. Braun, 
1992). In cases where those techniques could not be 
applied, Marey used sequences of photographic images on 
a single glass plate. In 1888, replacement of the glass plate 
by a movable roll of light-sensitive material led to 
chmnophotography, a technique that avoided the problem 
of overlapping images. 






































R. Bongaardt & 0. G. Meijer 
I n  their studies of human walking. Braune and Fischcr 
( 1895-1 904) adopted Marey‘s techniques. Sources of light, 
which could he filmed, were attached to the body of a walk- 
ing person. To allow for biomechanical analysis, Braune 
and Fircher (1889/1984) calculated masses and centers of 
gravity from cadaver specimens. Their mechanistic under- 
standing of human gait was considered state of the art for 
dccadcs to come. Thus, when Bernstein entered the field of 
movement. it was clear that progress would be critically de- 
pcndcnt upon the further development of measurement 
techniques. 
Measrrring Detuils 
The ycar hefore Bcrnstein entered the Central Labor 
Institute, he attended lectures on mathematics and musicol- 
ogy, which clearly influenced his work. The majority of his 
articles in thc first period under discussion (1920-1930) 
were devoted to the problem of measuring movement with 
sufficient precision. In three articles in the second period 
(1930-1948). he referred directly back to the earlier work 
(I.c.. Bernstcin, 1934/1967g, 1936; Bernstein & Dement- 
Jeff, 1933). Although those three articles were written later 
i n  the period, wc discuss them in the present section. 
I n  1927, Bernstein presented a method for analyzing 
irregular signals with a decreasing amplitude (convergent 
ciperioclic trigoriomerric scrim). The irregularity, he suggest- 
ed, may result from the superimposition of regular rhythms 
that have no rational relationships. By developing a Taylor 
series of the signal, one can infer the partial period of each 
constituent rhythm as well as its corresponding amplitude 
and relative phasc. That method, Bemstein (1927a) contend- 
cd, could be applied to acoustics, gait analysis, industrial 
labor, or, for instance, movement pathology. 
In cooperation with the Institute for Music Sciences, 
Bernstein developed a motion picture camera, the kymocy- 
chgruph. to “extract the maximal available amount of 
information about thc process of movement” (Bernstein, 
1934/1967g. p. 7; cf. Bernstein, 1927b). A combination of 
spccific technical features distinguished kymocyclography 
troin comparablc methods. First. it allowed for great spa- 
liotemporal precision in the measurement of movements; 
sccond, it did not interfere with the ongoing movements of 
the suhjects; and third, by including both a temporal and a 
spatial framc of reference, it allowed for swift data analysis 
(Bcrnstein. 1927b, 1936). 
In  kymocyclography, different film sizes (3.4-12.0 cm) 
could he used. The film moved evenly and with adjustable 
specd (0.650 mm). One could adjust the film’s movement 
frcquency (from 60 Hz up to 500 Hz; Bernstein & Popova, 
1929) by using a rotating disk with holes, so that the filmed 
movement could be broken into segments; the disk thus 
functioned as a high-speed shutter. When air was blown 
through holes in the disk, a siren-like sound was emitted. 
One could thcn determine the speed of the disk by using a 
pitch fork that produced the same tone. From that speed, a 
time fraine could be obtained that was sufficiently precise 
even for slow-motion analysis (Bernstein & Dementjelf, 
1933). One could create a spatial frame of reference by con- 
tinuously filming a measuring rod in the background. 
Simultaneous recordings of the mirror reflection of thc 
movement allowed for three-dimensional analysis (Bern- 
stein, 1930). All in all, one could accommodate the mea- 
surements to almost any experimental set-up. “In order to 
add ‘flesh’ to the picture” (Kozulin, 1984, p. 63), Bernstcin 
used living humans to determine the centers of gravity of 
body parts (cf. Bernstein, 1936). 
Those technical and methodological efforts all served to 
allow scientists to progress from studying the what of 
movement (trajectories) to the how (“analysis of underlying 
mechanisms”; Bernstein & Popova, 1929, p. 397). Bern- 
stein wished to calculate velocity from position, accelera- 
tion from velocity, and force from acceleration in order to 
infer the central signal from force. He derived that approach 
from the mechanicism that characterized Braune and Fisch- 
er’s work. In that vein, Bemstein claimed that the results of 
kymocyclographic analysis revealed “with great clarity the 
high degree of automation . . . mechanical simplicity and 
lawful structure” (Bernstein, 1927b, p. 789 [translated by R. 
B. and 0. M.]) of, for instance, the filing movements of d 
skilled laborer. 
Thus, the innovations in Bernstein’s first period were of 
a technological, not a conceptual, nature. There were, how- 
ever, signs of a more sophisticated style of reasoning. In ;I 
1929 article on piano playing, Bernstein and Popova 
showed that relationships within the neurornotor system arc 
not as straightforward as Braune and Fischer would have 
predicted. To infer the central signal one must know morc 
than just the force, Bernstein and Popova argued, becausc 
torque depends on the length of the lever arm. More signif- 
icant, the same “tone force” can be realized by differcnt 
constellations of mass and velocity. The movements of 
piano players are indicative of such “non-univocality”, If  
one varies the pace of the movements, different forms of 
organization emerge: 
During slow tempos, the movement consists of isolated 
impulses; during medium tempos, the movement corre- 
sponds to the oscillations of a compound pendulum; during 
the fastest tempos, there is a transition to forced elastic oscil- 
lations of a simple pendulum (Bernstein & Popova, 1929, p. 
432 [authors’ translation]). 
The Period of “Political Correctness” (19361948) 
At the end of the 1920s it was unclear which of three 
schools in neuropsychology would gain hegemony within 
the Soviet Union. Thus far, methodology had been mainly 
mechanistic, but now the crucial question was what exactly 
should constitute the “materialist base” (Kozulin, 1984, p. 
20) of Soviet science. 
At the school that Bekhterev directed, research was being 
conducted on associative reflexes. After his death, in 1927, 
it was rumored that Bechterev had been neuropsychological 
consultant to the Kremlin rulers and that the official reports 






































Bernstein’s Theory of Movement Behavior 
ahoiit the cause of death were clearly conflicting (Kozulin. 
lY8.4). Nonetheless. the theories offercd by Bekhterev’s 
school continued to be preeminent within most universities 
throughout the country. Pavlov, who had rcceived the 1904 
Nohcl Prize for physiology for his work on the mechanisms 
o l  digestive secretion (Grigorian, 1074). was then in 
Lrningrad. Determined to overthrow Bekhterev, Pavlov had 
begun in the 1920s to work on neuropsychology (higher. 
nrr\*ms activity). In his theory of conditioned reflexes, he 
capiializcd on his earlier, successful mechanistic approach. 
LIncil late in his life. Pavlov was critical of* communism. 
Still, in  an official decree (dated January 24, 1921), Lenin 
had praiscd Pavlov’s work, emphasizing “the outstanding 
scientific services of Academician 1. P. Pavlov. which are of 
cnormous significance to the working class of the whole 
world’ (The Nobel Foundation. 1997). Finally. Kornilov, 
whose Marxist “reactology” distinguished several “levels of 
reaction” (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) was in Moscow. 
Kornilov’s school was based explicitly on dialectical mate- 
rialism and was therefore considered politically correct. 
However, studies of higher levels of reaction werc always at 
risk of  being denounced for “bourgeois tendencies”. 
At thc end of 1930. the Bekhterev school lost its precmi- 
nuice. One of its proponents was forced to admit that “we 
ha\ L‘ witnessed certain attempts to base Soviet psychology 
on different psychological trends which are. in their essence 
and origin, avowedly bourgeois, instead of founding i t  on 
thc philosophical heritage of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Bol- 
sht-vik experience. and the works of Stalin” (Kozulin, 1984, 
p. i9). 
Clearly, the Soviet regime had taken control, and through 
I950 no principled discussions on the concepts of scientif- 
ic. methodology were allowed: The concepts of science 
were to be derived directly froni dialeciical materialism 
(Rozulin. 1984). In Stalin‘s Soviet Union. despite the mass 
murders of the Kulaks, the fake trials, the terror of the 
purges. and the devastation of World War 11, public dis- 
agreement was not permitted (cf. Aksyonov, 1995). Howev- 
er, whole generations of young intellectuals still genuinely 
wanted to build a communist science; they viewed the 
excesses of Stalinism as mistakes that eventually would be 
nicnded (Joravsky, 1989; Kozulin. 1984; L. Latash, March 
1995, personal communication). 
From 1930 through 1948, the fate of the schools of 
Pavlov and Kornilov remained undccided. I t  was Russian 
( n o t  Soviet) nationalism, so typical of the period after 
World War 11, that finally led to the canonization of Pavlov. 
111  the early 1930s, there was no way that Bernstein could 
alivady have foreseen that development. Most of his articles 
thdt are available to us from the second period of his work 
contain. in one way or another, a rejection of Pavlov’s (and 
Braune and Fischer’s) simplistic mechanicism. The core of 
Rcrnstein’s argument appears to be that Pavlov failed to 
understand the brain because he failed to understand its 
most important function. that is, the organization of move- 
iiicnt. I n  1935, when Bernstein published his now-famous 
article on coordination and localization. the 15th Interna- 
tional Physiological Congress was held in Leningrad and 
Moscow in honor of Pavlov. At the time, Bernstein was 
working on a book, Contempi>rary Studies in the Physiolo- 
gy of the Nervous System, which contained a strong critique 
of Pavlov’s theory. When Pavlov died in 1936, however, 
Bernstein refrained from publishing that manuscript 
(Feigenberg & Latash, 1996). In 1948. Bernstein received 
the Stalin prize for his 1947 book, On rite Constritction of 
Movemenrs. In a manuscript that was written during the 
same period, “On Dexterity and its Development,” he 
accused the adherents of conditioned retlexes of “careless- 
ness” in their scientitic reasoning (Bernstein, 1991/1996, p. 
179). the strongest anti-Pavlovian statement that we have 
found in his translated work. Soon, however. attacks by 
neo-Pavlovians would silence Bernstcin, and thc manu- 
script was not published during his lifetime. 
The only confirmation we have of Bernstein’s awareness 
of problems surrounding political correctness is that the 
term mechanics, used so often in the first pcriod of his 
work. had been replaced by dvnamics. Whether that change 
arose from his genuine enthusiasm for the development of 
communist science, out of political expediency. or in a 
deliberate attempt to lake over hegemony from Pavlov, 
remains to be established. 
During this second period, Bernstcin was strongly intlu- 
enced by developments in Germany, where. in the life sci- 
ences, researchers were exploring alternatives for mechani- 
cism and for vitalism, which is the idea that the nature of a 
living organism results from a vital force. In new approach- 
es, the role of wholes was emphasized. there was a focus on 
hierarchical levels, and dynamical processes wcre being 
considered (cf. Von Bertalanffy, 1933/1Y62) Biological 
organisms were seen as functional systems, junction and 
,r.\:vrem becoming central concepts in the works of biologists 
and psychologists such as Anokhin (e.g.. 1935). KBhler 
(e.g.. 1924. 1933). Von Uexkull (cf. 1980). and Weiss (e.g.. 
1928). Bernstein incorporated many of their idcas into his 
own thinking (cf. Bongaardt. 1996). 
In the international literature, some authors made con- 
nections between organismic biology and mathematical 
physics. Van der Pol and Van der Mark ( 1928). for instance. 
interpreted the heartbeat as a relaxation-oscillation, a phe- 
nomenon that synchronizes easily with external rhythms. 
Adrian and Buytendijk (193 1 )  discovered in the medulla 
oblongata of the goldfish a neural oscillator that evidently 
was involved in the organization of breathing. Between the 
two World Wars, the mathematical physics of stable oscilla- 
tions was developed mainly in the Soviet Union. Inspired 
by Poincare, Lyapunov had started to study stability. That 
initiative was picked up by Krylov, who modeled the stabil- 
ity of ships. After an initial silence, the views of Lyapunov 
and Krylov became widely debated in the Soviet Union of 
the 1930s (cf. Grigorian, 1973a, 1973b. 197%). 
It was Andronov who laid the foundations of what is 
known today as the t h r q  of dynatnic syrterrrs. In 1937. 






































R. Bongaardt & 0. G. Meijer 
Andronov and Chaikin published Theory of Oscillations. 
An important question in that book was how the state ( x )  of 
a system changes over time (duldt; the authors used the term 
d. State changes may be a function of only the state of the 
system itself (i = f [ x ] ) ,  or also of an external factor, mod- 
eled as time (i = f [x , t ] ) .  Andronov and Chaikin defined a 
system as autonomous if it changes over time as a function 
of its own state only (Andronov & Chaikin, 193711949, p. 
9). With their approach, it became possible to develop math- 
ematical models for autonomous phenomena. By 1935, 
Bernstein had already addressed similar issues regarding 
the organization of movements. 
Bernstein had moved, by 1935, from the Central Labor 
lnstitute to the Laboratory for Biomechanics of the Central 
Scientific Institute of Physical Culture, while also setting up 
laboratories for biomechanics in several other scientific 
institutions (Feigenberg & Latash, 1996). Shortly before the 
war. he became director of the movement laboratory of the 
lnstitute of Neurology, which had originated from the Insti- 
tute of Experimental Medicine. In 1942, the latter Institute 
also gave rise to the Academy of Medical Sciences, where 
Bernstein was later elected as a corresponding member. 
On June 22, 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. 
When German troops approached Moscow, Bernstein fled 
to Siberia, together with his wife, Beatrice, whom he had 
married in the 1930s, and his stepdaughter, Tatiana. Condi- 
tions were harsh, and they traveled to Tashkent upon an 
invitation from Bernstein’s brother (Feigenberg & Latash, 
1996). No experimental work could be done until after the 
war; Feigenberg’s (1988) bibliography of Bernstein’s works 
cites no publications for the years 1942-1944. Once back in 
Moscow, Bernstein shared in the atmosphere of general 
optimism (Feigenberg & Latash, 1996). while he met with 
recognition and success. At the same time, however, his 
enemies were preparing to attack. In 1949, Kreshtovnikov 
wrote in “Theory and Practice in Physical Culture” that 
“Bernstein violated the principles of the [Communist] 
party’s approach and historical perspective . . . , displayed 
adoration of foreign scientists, , . . neglected the importance 
of the works by I. P. Pavlov” (cited in Feigenberg & Latash, 
1996, p. 249). The days of success were over. 
The Structure of Coordination 
In the late 1920s, Bernstein had reported with some pride 
that his kymocyclographic analysis highlighted “the high 
degree of automation . . . mechanical simplicity and lawful 
structure” (Bernstein. 1927b, p. 789; see the previous dis- 
cussion) of cyclical movements. In 1935, however, he came 
to the conclusion that “successive movements of cyclical 
nature never exactly repeat themselves [italics added]” 
(Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 48). He had made cyclograms of 
rhythmic movements on a stationary photographic plate and 
had seen that the metric details of the movement were dif- 
ferent on each repetition. Because the details were never the 
same twice, straightforward inference from any observed 
movement via force to the central signal was not possible. 
Bernstein then presented a mathematical analysis of how 
the state of a moving system changes over time. Torque, he 
assumed, changes as a function of joint angle, angular 
velocity, and muscle excitation. The “structure of muscle 
excitation” (Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. I9)‘must at least in 
part be a function of the central signal. Mathematically, the 
implication of that assumption is that muscle excitation E 
must be modeled as a function of time, as in the following: 
E =At). 
If E were determined only by f ,  Bernstein reasoned, the 
actual movement would have no relationship whatsoever 
“to the local conditions operating in the system” (Bernstein, 
1935/1967e, p. 18), as indeed is the case in “proprioceptivc 
ataxia” (p. 19). Thus, in Bernstein’s view, purely centralist 
models of control refer to pathological conditions. Muscle 
excitation must be partly a function of the state of the sys- 
tem itself: 
( 2  ) 
If E were determined only by joint angle and angular veloc- 
ity, however, the system would suffer from “central paraly- 
sis” (Bernstein, 1935/1967e). Given that muscle excitation 
has a functional structure, Equations 1 and 2 must be com- 
bined. 
And so we are left with the hypothesis that the excitation of 
a muscle E must be both a function of time and a function of 
position and velocity, and must be described in . . . the form 
. . . E(t, x, dx/dr) (Bemstein, 1935/1967e, pp. 18-19). 
E = Ax, dxldt) . 
That is, 
E =At. X ,  drldr). (3) 
That equation permits an “exceptionally simple transla- 
tion into physiological terms” (Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 
19). There is a peripheral cycle of interaction in which 
movement occurs whenever the “equilibrium in the force 
field is destroyed” (Bernstein, 1940/1967a, p. 62) by exter- 
nal forces or by the central signal. Within that cycle, 
changes in muscle tension bring about a movement and the 
movement affects the condition of the muscles by shortening 
or stretching them causing further changes in their tension. 
. . . [Consequently,] this form of interaction does not presup- 
pose a one-to-one correspondence bemeen force and move- 
ment, that is, . . . one and the same sequence of changes in 
forces may produce different movements on successive rep- 
etitions (Bernstein, 1940/1967a, p. 62). 
At least two values independent of the equation itself 
(for example, position, velocity, the force field as a whole) 
are required for the solution of the differential equation that 
relates forces and movements. That requirement explains 
why, integrated with the peripheral cycle of interaction, a 
central cycle of interaction exists “in which the central ner- 
vous system constantly receives information as to the state 
of these independent parameters of integration and adapts 
its effector impulses in an exact relationship to the latter” 
(Bernstein, 1940/1967a, p. 63). The functional integration 
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of those two cycles yields ‘Ifunctionul non-univocality . . . 
betwecn impulses and effects” (p. 105). That is. the same 
ohstwahle movement may be effected by different inner- 
vations, or the same innervation can lead to different move- 
rneitts. Bernstein inferred that the changing nonlinearities 
in  [he relationships between impulses and forces and 
movement preclude the mechanicistic idea of a central sig- 
nal just “striking a piano key” (cf. Bernstein, 1935/1967e). 
He reminded the reader, as follows, of the failure of the 
steiirn organ: 
I would like to recall here the failure in 1923 of the invention 
0 1  ‘a symphony of whistles’. An attempt to convert steam 
whistles into a musical instrument with an organ keyboard 
l i ~ i l ed  because any given whistle could not be relied upon to 
\t>und the same on every occasion, and its pitch would vary 
with the pressure of steam, with the number of whistles 
sounded simultaneously, with the degree to which the steam- 
channel was clear, and so on, so that i t  was impossible to 
obtain a one-to-one correspondence between the keyboard, 
I 111 the one hand, and the frequency of the tones obtained, on 
ilie other (Bemstein, 1935/1967e, p. 33). 
tiowever convincing that argument on the basis of chang- 
ing nonlinearities was (and still is), Bernstein more often 
pointed to the degrees of freedom problem. In the old con- 
ception of control, the central signal was alleged to handle 
most if not all degrees of freedom. Bernstein’s “revolt” 
(K~izulin. 1984, p. 62) was to argue that in motor control a 
continuous. circular flux of information is needed so that 
those degrees of freedom can be mastered. 
On the basis of that reasoning, Bernstein, for the first 
tinie, presented the idea of a hierarchical organization of 
thc movement systems. He distinguished, first, “in the 
supreme nervous organ an exact representation of what will 
l a w  occur at the periphery” (Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 
40); second, mediating processes of integration of the cen- 
lral signal and sensory information; and, finally, the biome- 
chanical organization of the locomotor apparatus and the 
overt structure of the movements themselves. He referred to 
the latter two levels as the coordinution of movements 
(Bernstein, 1935/1967e), which he later defined as “over- 
coming excessive degrees of .freedom of our movement 
or+ms. that is, turning the movement organs into control- 
hrhle systems” (Bernstein, 1991/1996, p. 41). Coordination 
is of a much more flexible nature than the traditional reflex. 
Degrees of freedom are taken together, now in this way and 
then in another, depending on the task and on the experi- 
ence of the performer. 
When someone . . . first attempts to master the new co-ordi- 
nation. he is rigidly, spastically fixed and holds the limb 
involved, or even his whole body, in such a way as to reduce 
the number of kinematic degrees of freedom which he is 
requircd to control. . . . Having mastered the first degrees of 
tieedorn the organism increasingly raises its ban on further 
degrees of freedom. . . . Here two successive stages of release 
may be observed. The first degree corresponds to the lifting 
0 1  all restrictions. thal is, to the incorporation of all possible 
The second highest stage of co-ordi- 
national freedom corresponds to a degree of co-ordination at 
which the organism is not only unafraid of reactive 
phenomena in a system with many degrees of freedom, but 
is able to structure its movements so as 10 ufilize entirely the 
reoctive phenomena which arise (Bernstein. 1940/1967a. pp. 
Movement coordination was seen both as a process (the 
neuromotor processes of integration) and as a structure (its 
observable form), just as organs can be understood as 
processes as well as structures (Bernstein 1940/1967a). The 
structure of coordination reveals itself in the “motor field 
(Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 42), that is, the space in which 
movements take shape. In the motor field, there is no essen- 
tial difference between producing an A or an A, just as “the 
recognition of the letter A does not require the presence of 
any metrical properties and is, on the contrary, entirely 
dependent on the presence of determinate topological cues” 
(Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 44). Like the perceptual field, 
the motor field is characterized by global topology rather 
than specific metrics: 
The co-ordinational net of the motor field must be regarded, 
in distinction to a net in Euclidean geometry. firstly as non- 
rectilinear, and secondly as oscillating like a cobweb in the 
wind. Its ‘oscillation’ does not, however, in every case pro- 
ceed so far as to destroy topological relationships either of 
zero order (for example the category ‘between’) or of the 
first and perhaps even higher orders (Bernstein, 1935/ I967e. 
pp. 48-49). 
Because coordination “hints at the common action of 
separate elements” (Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 30). it cannot 
be based on “particular processes in individual neurons, but 
on the determinate organization of their common activity” 
(Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 30). Hence, in his notion of 
“localization” in the nervous system. Bernstein does not 
refer to individual neurons but rather to their common orga- 
nization. Analogously, according to his view, the central 
signal is written in terms of the overall structure of the 
movement and not in terms of its spatial details, forces, or 
torques. Taking that notion as a starting point, Bernstein 
proposed to use a principle of equal simplicity, which holds 
that topologically similar movements are univocally related 
to a particular organization within the central nervous sys- 
tem and the brain. 
Through the study of the movement coordination (both 
structure and process), Bernstein strove to gain insight into 
the “true categories” (Bernstein, 1935/1967e, p. 36) of 
movement organization that exist in the brain and, ultimate- 
ly, to understand the organization of the brain itself. 
Movement und the Bruin 
Bernstein did not reject Braune and Fisher’s mechani- 
cism and Pavlov’s theory of conditioned retlexes all at once. 
The path leading to that conclusion was tortuous. Bern- 
stein’s articles are difficult to read, and they often contain 
remarks that lead away from the main argument or are even 
wrong. In his zeal to reject conditioned reflexes, for exarn- 
pie. he emphasized so strongiy the structural integrity of 
movement that he suggested that all the details of move- 
108- 109). 






































R. Bongaardt & 0. G. Meijer 
mcnt timing must be “organized within the required degree 
of  accuracy a full second beforehand” (Bernstein, 
19351 I967e, p. 24). Contrary to his own theory of coordi- 
nation. Bernstein failed to argue here that the final temporal 
structure of the movement may be an emergent property of 
thc movcment system as a whole. In addition, after telling 
us that movements never exactly repeat themselves (Bern- 
stein, 1935/1967e), he states. in an analysis of locomotion, 
that the “most rigid succession of all details is followed 
from cycle to cycle and these details are extremely repeti- 
Live for each subject” (Bemstein, 1940/1967a, p. 60). 
Bcriistein took inspiration from a great variety of 
sources, sometimes elaborating on the theories he bor- 
rowed, sometimes exploiting them in one or two of his arti- 
cIcb. but he then remained silent about those theories in the 
rcst of his work. In 1935, for instance, his notion of the 
“topology” of the overall structure of a movement was 
clcarly derived from Gestalt theory; but from 1940 onward, 
hc rejected Gestalt theory because of its lack of biological 
detail (Bongaardt, 1996). In 1940, he came under the spell 
of Weiss’s ( 1928) hierarchical “organicism,” but he then 
proceeded to change Weiss’s anatomical hierarchy almost 
heyond recognition, ending up with the theory that the 
motor problem at hand compels the organism to choose, or 
cven to construct, a particular level of coordination for its 
solution (Bernstein, 1991/1996). 
Amid all those details it is sometimes difficult to keep 
track of the overall topology of the theory that Bemstein 
was in the process of developing. Sometimes one sees him 
as the originator of a new theory of coordination (Greene, 
1972; Turvey, 1977). At other times, he seems to be an 
important neuroscientist working on the organization of the 
brain (Fcigenberg & Latash, 1996; Pickenhain. 1988). He 
did both at the same time, however, and he regarded his 
work as an integrated enterprise, as revealed in the title of 
his article, “The Problem of the Interrelation of Coordina- 
tion and Localization” (Bernstein, 193Y1967e). In fact, in 
all of his publications from the second period of his work, 
hc had something to say about movement and about the 
brain; hut through a variety of research strategies, he in fact 
qucstioned their interrelationship. 
With great enthusiasm, Bernstein studied a wide variety 
of movements in sports, daily life, labor, and in human 
pathology. After presenting an elaborate analysis of the 
kinetic details of human walking, he concluded that the 
rctlex arc cannot exist, and that the organization of move- 
nicnt requires reflex rings (Bernstein, 1940/1967a). He used 
the newly developed technique of electroencephalography, 
and hc claimed that the electrical oscillations of individual 
neurons necessarily organize into groups with synchronized 
frequency and phase. He concluded that brain slow waves 
arc derived from old organizations of movement (paleoki- 
rrefics) and phylogenetically precede the emergence of the 
striated muscles, whereas brain fast waves (neokinetics) 
ovolved on top of the older level, like a telegraph wire sys- 
tem, although they are still controlled by the older level. That 
notion implies, Bernstein contended, that “preliminary 
adjustments and adaptations proceed on the background of 
intense ongoing activity rather than on the background of 
general rest of the organism” (Bemstein, 1945/1998, p. 297). 
In 1947, Bemstein received the State prize for his book. 
On the Construction of Movements (that as yet untranslated 
work is summarized in Bernstein, 1991/1996). Every skill, 
he claimed, arises in answer to a particular motor problem; 
the task of the organism is to assign control of sensory cor- 
rections to a particular level of coordination. First, at the 
paleokinetic level, muscle tone, that is, the preparedness of 
the organism, is maintained. Synergies, are dealt with at the 
second level, the level of muscular-articular linkages. That 
level is “well-suited for the accumulation oflije experievwc., 
for building new coordinative patterns and storing them in 
the treasury of motor memory” (Bemstein, 1991/1996, p. 
128). The level of space “emerged when vertebrates moved 
onto solid ground and into the air and also acquired extrcm- 
ities” (Bemstein 1991/1996, p. 132). At the space level, 
movements ‘‘possess a somewhat business-like dryness and 
do not involve large groups of muscles. They are, so to say. 
the chamber music of the muscle’’ (p. 135). The highest con- 
trolling level that Bernstein analyzed is that of action, whcrc 
there are “whole sequences of movements that together 
solve the motor problem. , . . All the movements . . . arc 
related to each other by the meaning of the problem” (p. 
146). 
In his 1947 theory, there were also clear signs of thc 
emergence of new issues that would occupy him for the rest 
of his life. In his manuscript, “On Dexterity and Its Devel- 
opment,” he defined dexterity as the ability to solve motor 
problem in always novel ways. He stressed that such “motor 
wits in unexpected situations” (Bernstein, 199111996, p. 
177) are principally different from coordination. Dexterity, 
Bernstein argued, is a typical characteristic of animals with 
a well-developed cortex. Such “highly developed animals 
demonstrate higher variability over the centuries” (Bcrn- 
stein, 1991/1996, p. 47). That variability is reflected not 
only in their motor behavior but also in the brain, in which 
“telegraph wires” send “blind spikes” on top of the “bio- 
electrical glitter” of the underlying paleokinetics (cf. Bern- 
stein, 1945/1998). 
After the Neo-Pavlovian Craze (1954-1966) 
In 1924, Vygotsky presented his views to the Second 
Russian Psychoneurological Congress in Moscow. Vygot- 
sky intrigued the audience by challenging the idea that 
behavior consists of reflexes. In his activity theory, he held 
that human behavior is “structured and organized according 
to specifically human social goals” (Kozulin, 1984, p. 105). 
and that those can be scientifically studied. 
When Vygotsky appeared on the scene, world psychology 
was in a state of crisis. Psychology was divided into two iso- 
lated fields. On the one hand, there was the research of Ivan 
Petrovich Pavlov and Vladimir Mikhailovich Bechterev o n  
the physiological mechanisms that underlie behavior. How- 






































Bernstein’s Theory of Movement Behavior 
c\c‘r. this work did not provide an adequate method for the 
aiialysis of the more complex forms of man’s conscious 
rnental activity, such as abstract thinking. deliberate remern- 
hcring and voluntary attention. . . . Young Soviet psycholo- 
gists wanted to take the complex forms of man’s conscious 
;it tivity as their subject matter, but they wanted to study the 
;irca objectively; to produce a scientific explanation of the 
dtvelopment and laws of the higher forms of mental activity. 
. . It  was Vygotsky who .  . . felt that attempts to reduce men- 
1i11 activity to a system of reflexes were the wrong way to 
pioceed (Luria, cited in Cole & Cole, 197 1. p. 82). 
Rernstein learned about the psychology of activity as early 
as I924 through his work at the Moscow Institute of Exper- 
inicntal Psychology, where he collaborated and co-pub- 
lishcd with. among others, Leontiev, Luria, and Vygotsky 
(ct’. Feigenberg, 1988). 
In the early 1930s. research in the field of psychology of 
activity ran into problems, allegedly because it was focused 
too much on the human individual and on social behavior as 
ii higher. ”cultural function” separated from lower, “natural 
I‘unctions” (Kozulin, 1984; cf. Van der Veer, 1990; Van der 
Vccr B Valsiner, 199 1 ). Vygotsky’s publications were black- 
listed, but as long as they did not mention his name, his stu- 
dents and colleagues were able to continue their work rela- 
tivcly undisturbed in faraway Kharkov. There, they studied 
thc importance of action for the development of mental func- 
tions. One of Vygotsky’s colleagues, Leontiev, recognized 
thc relevance of Bernstein’s “multilevel theory of movement 
coordination, suggesting that it could provide a . . . basis for 
his own theory of activity” (Kozulin, 1984, p. 70). 
lkrnstein’s rejection of the stereotyped reflex as a neuro- 
physiological basis for movement behavior was conceptual- 
ly close to the views expressed by researchers of the 
Kharkov school. On the other hand, much of his recognition 
caine from practical applications of his ideas on the con- 
struction of movements-in sports, in the production of 
artificial limbs, and, later, in the training of cosmonauts 
(Kozulin, 1984). However, the year he received his State 
priLe not only brought him acclaim, it also shattered his rel- 
atiw safety. 
’The main issue discussed at the 1948 biology session of 
thc Academy of Science was whether behavior results from 
education or from genetically fixed properties. It 
wits claimed that one could create new properties at will by 
manipulating external conditions (Lysenko, 1934- 
I 052/1954; Regelmann, 1980). To insiders, then, it came as 
no surprise that neo-Pavlovian conditioning gained 
supremacy in neuropsychology as a result of the 1950 Joint 
Scsion with the Academy of Medical Sciences. 
During the 1949 anti-Semitic campaign, Bernstein was 
accused of relying on foreign authors; and in 1950, he was 
olticially denounced in Pravda, the party-line newspaper 
(kbigenberg & Latash, 1996). Allegedly, Bernstein’s con- 
clusion that motor performance does not repeat itself was 
coiisidered incompatible with the neo-Pavlovian theory of 
thc conditioned reflex. He was fired, and the doorplate of 
thc Bernstein Laboratory for Biomechanics was hammered 
to pieces (Feigenberg & Latash, 1996). Living on his 
stipend from the Academy of Medical Sciences, Bernstein 
spent most of his time at home, on Shchukin Street in 
Moscow. There, Bernstein and his wife took daily doses of 
morphine at about 2 o’clock every afternoon (the morphine 
was acquired through the help of friends, but eventually by 
prescription, with official permission from the Ministry of 
Health). They did so until the end of their lives (L. Latash 
and V. Zatsiorsky, March 1995, personal communication). 
In September 1953, Khrushchev came into power, and in 
1954. Bernstein was allowed to work in the Institute of 
Neurology-now, as a senior scientist, entitled lo one assis- 
tant. He would walk there in the early morning, returning 
home around noon. In 1956, Bernstein retircd. By then, 
most of‘ his friends had lost their confidence in thc Soviet 
system, but Bernstein continued to refer to Maniism-Lenin- 
ism in his public speeches. Actually, the specter of neo- 
Pavlovianism would never leave him, and hi5 friends often 
met behind closed curtains when discussing his works (L. 
Pickenhain. personal communication). Being publicly, anti- 
Bernstein was a way to survive; and, for a long time. pay- 
ing lip-service to neo-Pavlovianism was considered expedi- 
ent (V. Zatsiorsky, March 1995, personal communication). 
Never having admitted his so-called mistakes (Kozulin, 
1984). Bernstein created a p h p i d o g y  qf uctivify without 
explicitly referring to Vygotsky, at least not in his translat- 
ed articles. In 1962, Bernstein presented his non-idealistic 
alternative to neo-Pavlovian reflexology at the All-Union 
Meeting on Philosophical Problems of the Physiology of 
Higher Nervous Activity and Psychology (Kozulin. 1984). 
During the same year, Gastev and the Central Labor Idsti- 
tute were officially rehabilitated through the initiatives of 
Berg, then the leading Soviet cyberneticist (Bailes. 1977). 
At that time, in Soviet politics, workers in mechanistic 
cybernetics were urged to provide and develop the knowl- 
edge needed to control the economy and enhance its success. 
By 1957, Bernstein had been invited to a seminar on cyber- 
netics by Lyapunov, the son of the famous mathematician 
(cf. Lyapunov, 1960). Bemstein was also one of the influen- 
tial contributors to a 1962 conference on Biological Aspects 
of Cybernetics, where he argucd that an integratcd cybernet- 
ics of control and optimization was to be realized by the 
“science of sciences, mathematics” (Bernstcin, 1962/1963, 
p. 69). At that point, his agenda coincided with that of Berg. 
the organizer of the conference. In his own contribution. 
Berg (1962/1963) literally copied phrases from Bernstein’s 
1957 work. Fundamentally, however, the two must have dis- 
agreed, because Berg defended reactive mechanics, and 
Bernstein promoted the notion of active dynamics. Scientif- 
ically, Bernstein stood closer to the influential, independent 
mathematician Gel’fand and to the theoretical physicist 
Tsetlin, who also contributed to the conference. 
Fascinated by Bernstein’s work, Gel’fand and Tsetlin 
created a movement laboratory, first in the Biophysics Insti- 
tute, later in the Institute for Problems of Information 
Transmission. Movement science grew unprecedentedly 
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through the work of Bernstein’s students (cf., e.g., Gel’fand, 
Curfinkel, Fomin, & Tsetlin, 1971). An important role in 
that development was played by Gel’fand, who initiated a 
seminar on a wide range of topics, inviting only the best in 
their respective fields. Some of the meetings were held at 
Bernstein’s home, where he preferred to have discussions 
with only a select few. Bernstein continued to meet his 
friends at home until he died in 1966 from renal cancer. 
Toward a Physiology of Activity 
ed to proceed beyond coordination. 
After the neo-Pavlovian craze period, Bernstein attempt- 
The period of struggle towards the recognition of the biolog- 
ical importance, the reality and the generality of the principle 
of cyclical regulation of life processes is now behind us. . . . 
The present author gave an account of the application of these 
concepts to the problem of the co-ordination of movements in 
a report in 1929 [not translated] in which this principle was 
given a general mechanical foundation . . . , and in 1935 
[Bemstein, 193511967el he reduced it in general terms to dif- 
I’erential equations. The debate, in these initial stages, was 
conducted sharply, but now seems to be over. . . . Clearly, now 
is the time to look forward (Bemstein, 1957/1967f, p. 114). 
In the psychology of activity, advanced by researchers of 
thc Kharkov school, the decisive role that experience plays 
in the development of higher functions such as language 
was emphasized. Without so much as referring to the 
Kharkov school, Bernstein, in his 1957 article, aimed at 
developing a physiology of motor acts that emphasized the 
reciprocal relationship between the moving organism and 
its environment. Motor problems arise “out of the external 
environment” (Bernstein, 1957/1967f, p. 1 15), upon which 
thc organism “actively operates” (p. 114), and from which 
i t  receives “sensory feedback” (p. 116). In essence, biolog- 
ical activity implies “the cognition of the surrounding 
world through action and the regulation of action within it” 
(p. 124). 
Contrary to what “many thinkers in the Western world” 
(Bernstein, 1957/1967f, p. 124) had said, Bernstein held that 
the active interaction of the organism with its environment 
takes an objectively knowable world as its starting point. 
Here the degree of objective reality of the information is a 
decisive prerequisite for the success or failure of the action 
to he performed. During the entire course of phylogenesis of 
living organisms natural selection inexorably sifted out those 
individuals in which the receptors controlling motor activity 
operated like a curved mirror. . . . Each meaningful motor 
directive demands not an arbitrarily coded, but an objective, 
quantitatively and qualitatively reliable representation of the 
surrounding environment in the brain. . . . This also leads to 
knowledge through action and revision through practice 
which is the comerstone of the entire dialectical-materialis- 
tic theory of knowledge, and , . , serves as a sort of biologi- 
cal context for Lenin’s theory of reflection (Bernstein, 
Objective information allows for the planning of behav- 
ior within a changing environment. For that reason, Bern- 
stein argued, there must exist “a control element, which 
1957/1967f, pp. 119-120). 
conveys to the system in one way or another the required 
value of the parameter which is to be regulated” (Bernstein. 
1957/1967f, p. 129). The required value is then compared 
with the actual value, and the “interacting background lev- 
els of co-ordinational control” (Bernstein, 1957/1967f, p. 
136) are set to work to overcome the differences. 
Bernstein’s conception of a control element, or “leading 
level” (Bemstein, 1967/1988b, p. 130), led him to work on 
control, optimization, and planning. He came to regard his 
earlier work, for which he now coined the term “the physi- 
ology of coordination” (cf. Bernstein, 1957/1967f), as a 
deterministic and technical aspect of movement. In the 
1960% he wished to develop a comprehensive physiology of 
activity (cf. Bernstein, 1961/1967h). 
During the 1960s, Bernstein’s theory of the physiology of 
activity gradually unfolded; he aimed at nothing less than a 
non-metaphysical, naturalistic understanding of life. Ani- 
mals “pursue goals” (Bernstein, 1965/1988a, p. 2381, and 
those goals must have natural origins. Darwinian variation 
and selection is the natural mechanism that forms the basis 
of activity, that is, the “anti-entropic structuring of a self’ 
(p. 238). In that sense, activity is not restricted to movement 
behavior but can be found at all levels of life, from molec- 
ular complexes to brains “in all possible manifestations of 
vital activity both in onto- and morphogenesis, and in all 
forms of interaction of the living organism with its sur- 
roundings” (Bemstein, 1969, p, 120). 
Bernstein considered movement to be the most typical 
manifestation of activity. Hence, an advanced understand- 
ing of movement could serve as the basis of a general theo- 
ry of activity in living organisms. 
The fact that movements are goal directed appears to 
imply that they are controlled by what is to happen. Howev- 
er, the future cannot determine the present. The control ele- 
ment must therefore rely on a model (Bemstein, 
1961/1967h, p. 157) of the future. The hallmark of modeling 
is selecting relevant information-in the case of models of 
the future, “the essence of the matter . . . as yet unrealized’’ 
(Bernstein, 1961/1967h, p. 150). Moving organisms cannot 
afford to wait until the future materializes. They must take 
the initiative, thereby incorporating a measure of uncertain- 
ty into their motor acts. The structure of the past-present 
maps onto the brain and the resulting model is probabilisti- 
cally extrapolated so as to predict the “course of events in the 
environment” (Bernstein, 1962/1963, p. 68; cf. Bernstein. 
1960/1975). Hence, an important issue for physiologists and 
mathematicians alike is to determine which forms of extrap- 
olation are actually used by the nervous system. 
Considering the lower, purely biomechanical, types of regu- 
lation which antecede a particular action by a minimal peri- 
od of time, we apparently encounter extrapolation of the 
same type as that incorporated in a Taylor series with the use 
of two primary derivatives of information, that is, data from 
the joint and muscle signaling systems. (This is sometimes 
described as gradient extrapolation.) Considering more com- 
plex and meaningful types of plans for movements, such as 
may require reprogramming during their course, the higher 






































Bernstein’s Theory of Movement Behavior 
C ( I -  ordinational brain systems and the synthetic processes 
imolved will be found to include forms of probabilistic 
extrapolation among their equipment, and these will doubt- 
Ichs include such methods of active sampling as have been 
formulated and described in the contemporary mathematics 
o l  estimation as methods of non-local search (Bernstein, 
lOhl/l967h, p. 161). 
Brrnstein’s conception of models of the future was 
aligned with the mathematics of Gel’fand and Tsetlin. TO 
capture search strategies in biological systems. Gel’fand 
and Tsetlin (1962; cf. Gel’fand, Curfinkel, & Tsetlin. 
19hYl963) distinguished between “essential” and 
“nonessential” variables. Bernstein contended that finding 
the cbssential variables of a movement-to-be implies explor- 
ing i he topology “of the firture requirements of the individ- 
ual. . . . of that which is not yet, but which must be, the 
caw” (Bernstein, I967c, p. 187; cf. Bernstein, 1962/1963, 
196M 9673, 1965/1988a, 1969). When the solution-in-prin- 
ciplc to a motor problem is found, a resulting plan of action 
serves to realize the movement “whatever might happen, 
overcoming obstacles and, if necessary, reprogramming 
during operation” (Bernstein, 1962/1967i, p. 179). More- 
ovei.. the nonessential variables are not merely “yieldingly 
adaptive” (Bernstein, 1969, p. 122) during movements, but 
those aspects of the remaining variability that have no reac- 
tive adaptive value can justifiably be looked upon as search- 
variability. in which the active exploration of the environ- 
nient, its gradients, the optimal way to act, etc.. come to the 
lore (Bernstein. 1965/1988a, p. 245). 
During the last years of his life, Bernstein’s central con- 
cerii was the match between mathematical models and a 
naturalistic understanding of goal-directed behavior. “Biol- 
ogibts understand the problem but lack the mathematical 
skills, and mathematicians have the skills but don’t under- 
stand the problem” (Bernstein, 1965/1988, p. 246; cf. Lya- 
punov. 1972). He came to realize that cybernetics was insuf- 
ficiently equipped to deal with all relevant aspects of life 
and that. possibly, the “honeymoon of this union between 
automatic processes and physiology is over” (Bernstein, 
1 9 6 7 ~  pp. 185-186). Cybernetics may capture “self-pro- 
grainming automata” (Bernstein, 1967c, p. 187) that are 
able to estimate what will happen but cannot model what 
has to happen. 
Self-programming automata are perhaps good enough for 
coordination, but in the third period of his work Bernstein 
conceived of a biology of activity in which the goal-direct- 
edness of movement was modeled as a natural phenome- 
non. Eventually, Bernstein believed, a comprehensive math- 
ematics would be formulated that allows for understanding 
malerial systems that stochastically explore their goals, 
select one to pursue, and then find ways to realize this goal. 
As soon as we are equipped with the real, adequate mathe- 
niatical apparatus (maybe already in the near future) we can 
assume that biology and biocybernetics will fuse into one 
synthetic science. and will thereby reach a new, higher level 
I Bernstein, 196Y1988, p. 241 [authors’ translation]). 
Bernstein was almost 70 years old when he expressed 
that mathematical dream. In that final year, he invited his 
students and colleagues to his home. His message was that 
work should continue. no matter what happened (Feigen- 
berg, 1978). Shortly before he was to present an article 
titled, “The Immediate Task of Neurophysiology in the 
Light of the Modem Theory of Biological Activily,” at the 
1966 XVIlIth International Congress of Psychology in 
Moscow (cf. 1969), Bernstein died. 
Discussion 
It would be relatively easy to conclude that Bernstein, 
throughout his life, was inconsistent, jumping onto any 
“bandwagon” that passed by. First, he was inspired by 
Braune and Fischer. and then he rejected their work. He was 
taken with Gestalt theory in 1935. only to abandon that the- 
ory a few years later. Although many of his ideas were 
derived from Weiss, in his later work Bernstein changed 
Weiss’s theory beyond recognition. Even Pavlov must have 
been a source of inspiration to Bernstein, but he spent much 
energy attacking Pavlov’s theories. In the last phase of his 
life, he plunged into the latest fashion in psychology 
research, that is, into typical Soviet theories of activity. 
If we accept such a conclusion, however, we will com- 
pletely fail to do justice to the tenacity with which Bernstein 
pursued his quest. In fact, Luria (1987) emphasized that 
Bernstein “was a rare case of a scientist who practically 
devoted his whole life to one problem: The physiological 
mechanisms of human movements and motor actions” (p. 
85). Although, in its silence about Bernstein’s fascination 
with the brain, Luria’s statement is one-sided, wc whole- 
heartedly agree with his tone. 
Nevertheless. the overall structure of Bernstein work ren- 
ders it understandable that different authors have been 
inspired by different aspects of his theory. The thrust of his 
work is in its unity, which emerges in our reconstruction of 
its development. 
The Stalinist era produced one of the greatest tragedies in 
the history of science, and Stalinism was a horrifying 
instance of what human beings can do to other human 
beings-actions that we certainly cannot condone. During 
Stalin’s Soviet Union, people were forbidden to think in 
terms of a soul or to work in dualistic schemes. Nonethe- 
less, a whole generation of young intellectuals was forced 
to face the challenge to come up with natural models for 
those phenomena that traditionally had been explained by 
invoking the supernatural (cf. Joravsky, 1989). I t  is a matter 
of established historical fact that this generation took up the 
challenge. So did Bernstein. 
During the first phase of his work, Bernstein understood 
that detailed measurement of movement was a necessary 
prerequisite to advancing the field. He spent about 10 years 
on the development of his kymocyclography, without both- 
ering much about theory; his analysis with Popova of piano 
playing is the only exception we know of. He then under- 
took to unravel the consequences of his thesis that the orga- 
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nization of the brain is reflected in the structure of coordi- 
nation. In so doing, he developed a theory of the brain that 
was much more sophisticated, and realistic, than any theory 
previously offered in the Soviet Union (cf. Sporns & Edel- 
man, 1998). At the same time, he revolutionized the science 
of movement by showing, beyond doubt, that old theories 
(the piano key metaphor) were necessarily wrong, and that 
the organization of movement should be understood as the 
reciprocal attunement of several simultaneous kinetic and 
informational processes. It took him more than a decade to 
bring that idea to full fruition, after which i t  became clear 
that his theory could accommodate reactive phenomena but 
failed to say anything about the fact that animals are active, 
that is, that they take initiatives. Bernstein acknowledged 
that higher animals are more active than lower ones, and that 
higher animals possess a well-developed cercbral cortex. 
Hence, he argued that the formulation of goals and the 
search for ways to solve motor problems are functional 
properties of the cortex. Still, Bernstein realized that those 
higher phenomena were of such an abstract nature that no 
one could expect an explanation to come from neurophysi- 
ology alone. He therefore turned to mathematical modeling 
of planning and to searching for solutions. 
Bcrnstein may have entered the field of movement sci- 
ence in order to understand the brain. It is clear that he used 
his understanding of the brain to advance the understanding 
of movemcnt. His enthusiasm for all possible manifesta- 
tions of biological movement led to his receiving recogni- 
lion in the Soviet Union. Thus, in answer to our first ques- 
tion concerning the thrust of Bernstein’s theory of 
movement behavior, we conclude that Bernstein’s outstand- 
ing contribution to the sciences of the 20th century consist- 
ed 01‘ his conception of biological movement as a natural 
phenomenon, encompassing the interactions between the 
brain, the movement system, and the natural and cultural 
environments. 
Bernstein’s Heuristics 
Bcmstein wanted to include all the relevant aspects of bio- 
logical movement into one coherent theory of movement 
behavior. We contend that Bernstein realized, around 1935, 
that it would be impossible to avoid the notorious problem 
of relating levels that each require a different language of 
description. In the quantum mechanics of his time, for exam- 
ple, particles and waves were considered complementary, 
that is. both levels of description are needed, although the 
two levels arc not reducible one to another (cf. Pattee, 1993; 
Penrose, 1989). In his 1935 article, Bernstcin stated that 
quantum mechanics is difficult to understand but that there 
is no reason to believe that true theories have to be easy. 
Despite such problems, Bernstein displayed optimism, 
perhaps even overconfidence. In 1965, he presented his 
dream that all aspects of motor coordination and planning 
would finally merge into one comprehensive science of a 
mathematical nature. Given the history of mathematics in 
[he 20th century, he could have known that such complete- 
ness cannot exist in formal theories (cf. Rosen, 199 1 ). How- 
ever, Bernstein exploited problems; he did not avoid thcrn. 
We suggest that Bernstein exploited the problem of rclat- 
ing all relevant levels in the organization of movement by 
repeatedly shifting focus: His work was mainly mechanivtic 
in the 1920s; dynamic in the 1930s and 1940s; cybernetic 
and thus mechanistic again in the 1950s; and finally natu- 
ralistic with regard to planning and thus dynamic again in 
the 1960s. That shifting pattern reveals something more 
systematic than merely the pursuit of any attractive topic as 
it presented itself. 
Perhaps the nornenklururu forced Bernstein into that pat- 
tern. At first sight, such a picture appears to fit: In \he 
1920s. Gastev forced mechanicism upon his Institute. Al tcr 
1930, mechanicism was banned from scicnce. Then again, 
after the neo-Pavlovian craze, Berg’s cybernetics became 
important. In the last period of Bernstein’s work, he easily 
affiliated with the influential work of Gel’fand. Neverthe- 
less, the idea that he followed the pathway of mere political 
expediency is not tenable. Bcrnstein’s 1929 analysis with 
Popova contradicted thc then-dominant mechanicism. His 
rejection of purely central control i n  1935 must have 
involved political risk. Berg may have been influential in 
rehabilitating Bernstein, but Bernstein’s concept of the 
physiology of activity was contrary to Berg’s mechanistic 
ideas of control. In addition, in Bernstein’s final theory. he 
challenged scientists to develop formal models of how ani- 
mals set their own goals. 
Whether his tendency to be a dissident can bc understood 
in terms of his personality is not important to the prcnent 
argument. It is the heuristic value of Bernstein’s repeatedly 
shifting focus that is important. Some of thc major shifts of 
focus appeared even within a single article, particularly in 
the second period of his work; during that period, he 
attempted to focus on two different phenomena in each of 
his articles, that is, the structure of coordination and thc 
organization of the brain. One could say that Bernstcin pro- 
gressed like a skater: He moved forward by pushing to one 
side first and then to the other. 
Our second question concerns the relevance of Bern- 
stein’s work to the contemporary sciences of movement. 
Our answer is threefold: First, it remains important to 
model movement as a natural phenomenon and to refrain 
from dualistic schemes or from “taking loans” on intclli- 
gence (Dennet, 1987). Second, the outline of thc theory he 
created is still valid and challenging. To makc the move- 
ment system controllable, the organism needs coordination. 
Control itself can only be understood in terms of a motor 
problem (a task, for example, or a goal). Given such a prob- 
lem, the cortex stochastically searches for an essential vari- 
able. The essential variable is then used in control, whereas 
coordination is relegated to the lower levels. Third, we con- 
tend that Bernstein’s legacy to movement scicnce is a 
methodological one. His way of asking questions and 
reaching for the answers, that is, his shifting-focus heuris- 
tic, ensured that he could continue his quest for understand- 
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ing niovement while avoiding the pitfalls of the past. Bem- 
stcin was never theoretically dogmatic in trying to under- 
stand a particular aspect of human movement. By formulat- 
ing goals just out of reach, and by pushing off from 
eslahlished progress, Bernstein maintained a creative ten- 
sion within the sciencc of movement. He simply knew how 
to move ahead. 
Epilogue 
Ncither the Academy of Sciences nor the Academy of 
Medical Sciences wanted to host Bernstein’s funeral (L. 
Latash, 1995, personal communication). Permission to con- 
duct the funeral was obtained by the Institute of Higher 
Nervous Activity, whose director, Asratyan, had been one of 
thc leaders of Soviet neo-Pavlovianism. Thus, as fate would 
have it. Pavlov’s portrait was staring down at Bernstein’s 
coffn. The elite of neurophysiology and Gel’fand’s group 
fillccl the small hall to capacity. Gel’fand spoke, emphasiz- 
ing t3ernstein.s genius and modesty, and read the following 
poem by Boris Pasternak (1964, p. 70): 
I r  is no1 seemly to be famous: 
Celebrity does not exalt: 
There is no need to hoard your writings 
And to  preserve them in a vault. 
’ICI give your all-th~s is creation. 
And not to deafen and eclipse. 
How shameful, when you have no meaning, 
‘To be on everybody’s lips! 
Try not to live as a pretender, 
But so to manage your affairs 
Thai you are loved by wide expanses 
And hear the call of future years. 
I.cave blanks in life, not in your papers, 
And do not ever hesitate 
To pencil out whole chunks, whole chapters 
of your existence, of your fate. 
Into obscurity retiring, 
T~J your development to hide. 
Rs autumn mist on early mornings 
( ‘onceals the dreaming countryside. 
?m~ther, step by step, will follow 
The living imprint of your feet: 
But you yourself must not distinguish 
Your victory from your defeat. 
And never for a single moment 
Hetray your credo or pretend 
Hut be alive-this only matters- 
Alive and burning to the end. 
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